In various online/offline multiagent networked environments, it is very popular that the system can benefit from coordinating actions of two interacting agents at some cost of coordination. In this paper, we first formulate an optimization problem that captures the amount of coordination gain at the cost of node activation over networks. This problem is challenging to solve in a distributed manner, since the target gain is a function of the long-term time portion of the intercoupled activations of two adjacent nodes and, thus, a standard Lagrange duality theory is hard to apply to obtain a distributed decomposition as in the standard network utility maximization. In this paper, we propose three simulationbased distributed algorithms, each having different update rules, all of which require only one-hop message passing and locally observed information. The key idea for being distributedness is due to a stochastic approximation method that runs a Markov chain simulation incompletely over time, but provably guarantees its convergence to the optimal solution. Next, we provide a game-theoretic framework to interpret our proposed algorithms from a different perspective. We artificially select the payoff function, where the game's Nash equilibrium is asymptotically equal to the socially optimal point, which leads to no price of anarchy. We show that two stochastically approximated variants of standard game-learning dynamics overlap with two algorithms developed from the optimization perspective. Finally, we demonstrate our theoretical findings on convergence, optimality, and further features such as a tradeoff between efficiency and convergence speed through extensive simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N MANY online/offline networking environments, a variety of gains among nodes (or agents) is generated when they make efforts to adjust their states (or actions) with those of others. Two examples include the ones in wireless and social networks. First, in wireless sensor networks with duty cycled node activations for energy savings, each sensor node decides to be awake or not over time, which further depends on its neighbors' wake-up state and distance to the node. When two nearby nodes communicate, they are equipped with a robust wireless channel for mutual communication and, thus, their coordination (e.g., message exchange) can become more powerful at the cost of energy consumption while they are awake [2] , [3] . Thus, to achieve the desired coordination gain while turning OFF redundant sensors, each sensor node should smartly decide to wake up or not, which should often be done in a distributed manner. Second, in online/offline social networks, social relationships and interactions are of critical interest, since the strength of such interactions often determines how the network evolves, for example, adoption of a new technology or spread of information. For example, when a new technology becomes available, using the social relationships, more coordination gain due to the compatibility of the technology between two individuals is generated, whereas a certain cost due to the adoption of the new technology is incurred, for example, buying a new software [4] - [6] .
In this paper, we formulate an optimization problem called coordination gain maximization that suitably captures the gain due to peer-to-peer coordinations of connected node pairs and the cost due to individual node activations, as in the following form: max λ i ,λ i j connected node pair (i,j )
where U ij (·) and C i (·) are the coordination utility and the node activation cost functions, respectively. Intuitively, λ ij is the long-term time portion when both nodes i and j are simultaneously activated and, thus, coordinated, and λ i is the long-term time portion when node i is activated. This optimization seems to be a simple variant of a standard network utility maximization (NUM) [7] - [9] , where it is allowed to easily develop a nodewise distributed algorithm converging to the optimal solution. However, the problem in (1) significantly differs from a standard NUM problem, thus, developing a distributed algorithm is far from being trivial. The main challenge of solving this optimization problem lies in the fact that the standard Lagrange duality theory for a distributed decomposition is not possible since the objective function includes the term that is a function of the long-term intercoupling of the states of a pair of connected nodes, and, thus, a separability is not permitted. In many engineering systems, we often observe the tradeoff between efficiency and complexity, where optimal algorithms require extensive message passing or heavy computations, but light-weight approximate algorithms incur suboptimality. Stochastic simulation-based algorithms [10] , [11] have been investigated in various areas to handle expensive computations in efficient way by using random experimental simulations, in spite of some challenges such as slow convergence time and/or suboptimality of the resulting solution. Our primary goal is to develop a simulation-based distributed coordination decision algorithm that is "efficient", that is, hopefully achieving the optimal solution of (1) using random samples of configurations produced by locally-limited message passing. In this paper, we formulate an optimization problem of coordination gain maximization over networks by taking a framework of the binary pairwise undirected graphical model, undirected graphical model, known as an Ising model [12] , [13] , to capture pairwise coordinations and nodewise activations of the network, and then, propose distributed dynamic mechanisms that produce the optimal solution of (1). Our main contributions are summarized in what follows.
C1: We first introduce a distributed mechanism, called configuration decision mechanism CDM(θ), where, by each node's local state changes based on one-hop message passing, a node activation state of the network is randomly determined in a decentralized manner. This mechanism is governed by a given parameter vector θ that represents the strength of internode coordinations and the preference for activation of each node. We illustrate how the CDM aids in the designing of a distributed, efficient coordination decision algorithm.
C2: We then propose three simulation-based algorithms, called Coord-dual, Coord-steep, and Coord-ind, that provide how to update the parameter vector θ of the CDM in a distributed manner. We prove that all three algorithms provably converge to the optimal solution of (1), yet the rationale behind each scheme contains different perspectives of approximation and optimization mechanisms. The key technique toward a distributed operation is to run the CDM(θ) incompletely over time and exploit locally-observed information from random samples to update the parameter θ, which can guarantee the convergence to the optimal solution of (1) on the strength of stochastic approximation theory.
C3: Finally, we take a different angle to understand two algorithms Coord-steep and Coord-ind using a game theory. A gametheoretic framework is one of the powerful tools in the design and analysis of the behavior of multiagent systems, providing valuable insights into various local control rules for agents' behaviors [14] . In this paper, we design a noncooperative game with artificially-selected payoffs and show that it has a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) that is (asymptotically) equivalent to the socially optimal point, that is, the optimal solution of (1). We consider popular game dynamics, which we modify with the stochastic approximation technique, and find that those two game dynamics exactly correspond to Coord-steep and Coordind, respectively. We conduct extensive simulations to verify our theoretical findings.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present a large array of related works. In Section III, we formulate the coordination gain maximization problem, followed by the analysis of distributed coordina-tion algorithms in Section IV. In Section V, we provide interpretations from a game-theoretic view, demonstrate the performance of our algorithms through numerical results in Section VI, and finally conclude in Section VII. All the mathematical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
A variety of benefits from coordinating actions of wireless terminals or users has been widely studied in wireless networks. In the area of wireless sensor networks, various distributed, energy-efficient coordination schemes have been proposed recently, where sensors adaptively select to be coordinators or not, that is, stay awake and forward sensing data or not, while turning OFF redundant sensors for energy efficiency. The main interest of this area is scalable, localized, and robust coordination in large-scale environments, and, thus, most works have been studied to first, preserve the capacity and connectivity [3] , second, to improve the lifetime of the system and communication latency by using a geo-location information of sensors [15] , or third, to build a self-configuring localization system [2] .
In online/offline social networks, coordinating actions, for example, diffusion/adoption of information, of two (socially) interacting individuals is of significant importance, since the power of interactions often determines how the network evolves. An importance of a coordination mechanism, for example, a social structure, for efficient knowledge sharing has been stressed in [16] . There has been a surge of studies about the dynamics of diffusion (that is, a status of agents) by adopting an Ising model in statistical physics [5] , epidemic-based models [17] , or game-theoretic models [4] . Recently, researchers have studied how coordinated behavior might spread in a network, that is, game-theoretic diffusion models, and the impact of the network structure and/or seeding set on convergence speed [18] - [21] .
A large array of work about NUM problem have been studied, see [7] - [9] for surveys. The objective of NUM problem is to maximize a sum of all nodes' utilities, while not considering any pairwise status; thus, separability in the problem often provides a useful dual-based decomposition for an easy development of distributed algorithms. In recent years, the researches on achieving optimality in both throughput and utility in wireless scheduling (in a decentralized manner) have been studied from an optimization perspective [22] , [23] as well as from a game-theoretic perspective [24] - [26] for various baseline medium access control protocols. The intuitive idea of these works is that wireless links adaptively adjust access intensities by using local information, for example, queue length or empirical service rate, so as to achieve the desired performance.
This paper is based on the importance of the pairwise coordination impacts among individuals, where our main interest is how to find a sequence of node activations (and, thus, coordinations) in a decentralized manner whose long-term status leads to the solution of the problem in (1) that maximizes the network-wide coordination gain at the cost of node activation. Moreover, this paper provides new interpretations behind the results obtained from a game-theoretic perspective in the sense that first, we start from a noncooperative (ordinal potential) game, followed by the resulting NEs' efficiency, that is, no Price-of-Anarchy (PoA), and second, we provide how gameinspired learning dynamics of the game can be connected to the results from an optimization approach.
III. MODEL AND OBJECTIVE
A. System Model 1) Network Model: In this paper, we consider a network G = (V, E) consisting of a set V of nodes and a set E ⊂ V × V of edges. With this graphical representation, each node corresponds to an agent in social networks or a sensor node in wireless sensor networks, and each edge corresponds to a physical connectivity or a social relationship between nodes, that is, (i, j) ∈ E means that nodes i and j are connected and have an interaction. Note that we study undirected networks where interaction requires mutual consent, that is, (i, j) is equivalent to (j, i). Let N (i) = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E} denote the neighbors of node i.
2) Configuration and Coordination Scheduling: We consider a continuous time framework. Let σ i (τ ) ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether node i is active at time τ or not, that is, σ i (τ ) = 1 means that node i is active at time τ , and 0 otherwise. We say that nodes i and j are (or edge (i, j) is) coordinated when σ i (τ )σ j (τ ) = 1. We also denote by σ(τ ) = [σ i (τ )] i∈V a node configuration at time τ , and it is clear that a set of possible configurations of the graph G is defined as I(G) := {0, 1} |V | . To formally discuss a coordination gain, which we will introduce later, we define a coordination configuration as follows:
which is an augmented configuration vector capturing both the activation status of nodes and the coordination status of edges. Then, every coordination configuration belongs to Φ(G) := {0, 1} |V |+|E | . Now, a coordination scheduling (or simply scheduling) algorithm is a mechanism that selects σ(τ ) ∈ I(G) (thus, a coordination configuration φ(σ(τ )) ∈ Φ(G) is also determined) over time τ ∈ R + .
3) Coordination Region:
We now define the maximum achievable coordination region (also called coordination capacity region) Λ ⊂ [0, 1] |V |+|E | of the network, which is the convex hull of the feasible coordination configuration set Φ(G), that is,
The intuition of the notion of coordination capacity region comes from the fact that any coordination scheduling algorithm has to choose a node configuration from I(G) over time (thus, a coordination φ(σ) is determined), and w σ denotes the fraction of time selecting a node configuration σ (and, thus, a coordination φ(σ)). Hence, the long-term (average) time portion of node activation and edge coordination induced by any scheduling algorithm must belong to Λ.
B. Problem Description: Coordination Gain Maximization

1) Objective:
We require nodes and edges to control the long-term time portion (or frequency) of activation and coor- dination close to some boundary of Λ. Specifically, we aim at designing a coordination scheduling algorithm that decides σ(τ ) ∈ I(G) over time τ so that the long-term time portion of node activation and edge coordination converges to a solution of the following optimization problem:
This problem, which we call coordination gain maximization problem, captures interdependencies among nodes and a tradeoff between (edge) coordination utility and (node) activation cost, where U ij : [0, 1] → R is a strictly concave and continuously twice-differentiable coordination utility function of edge (i, j) ∈ E, and C i : [0, 1] → R is a strictly convex, continuously twice-differentiable activation cost function of node i ∈ V . Then, it is obvious that CG-OPT has the unique solution
The network coordination gain is defined as a total coordination utility subtracted by a total incurring cost. More coordination utility is generated as nodes i and j are coordinated more often, but it also incurs more cost of nodes i and j to be activated.
2) Example: To illustrate, we provide an example of CG-OPT and its solution structure, where we use a line topology with three nodes and two edges, as depicted in Fig. 1 . Now, CG-OPT in this example is expressed by max λ U 12 (λ 12 ) + U 23 (λ 23 )− C 1 (λ 1 ) + C 2 (λ 2 ) + C 3 (λ 3 ) .
Let the long-term time portion of activation and coordination be characterized by the distribution {π σ } σ∈{0,1} 3 , that is, λ 1 = π (1,0,0) + π (1,0,1) + π (1,1,0) + π (1,1,1) λ 2 = π (0,1,0) + π (0,1,1) + π (1,1,0) + π (1,1,1) λ 3 = π (0,0,1) + π (0,1,1) + π (1,0,1) + π (1,1,1)
Note that the total coordination gain is generated according to the long-term coordination time portion of two edges, that is, λ 12 and λ 23 , and the total incurring cost is due to the long-time activation of three nodes, that is, λ 1 , λ 2 , and λ 3 .
A smart scheduling is required since each node's activation should be coordinated with its neighboring nodes in order to produce enough gain at the cost of activation. For expositional convenience, let us choose the following utility and cost functions: U 12 (x) = U 23 (x) = log(x), C 1 (x) = C 2 (x) = x 2 , and C 3 (x) = 3x 2 , that is, more cost is incurred for node 3. Now a simple algebra gives the following distributions and the resulting optimal solution: π (0,0,0) = 0.5, π (1,1,0) = 0.0915, π (1,1,1) = 0.4085
where the optimal solution is attained by assigning some probability to the configuration (1, 1, 0) rather than giving a high priority only to (1, 1, 1), with some cost balancing by avoiding the activation of any node, that is, scheduling (0, 0, 0).
In this paper, our goal is to design a distributed coordination scheduling algorithm {σ(τ )} ∞ τ =0 that relies only on local information with one-hop message passing, but converges to the optimal solution of CG-OPT, that is,
A lot of challenges may arise, because the developed algorithm should work in an independent manner of the underlying topology and the shape of utility/cost functions, and more importantly the solution should be found in a distributed way, which may entail heavy computations to characterize the longterm time portion of activation and coordination. To overcome these challenges in an efficient way, we propose distributed simulation-based algorithms in the next section.
IV. DISTRIBUTED COORDINATION: ALGORITHM AND ANALYSIS
A. Configuration Decision Mechanism
We first introduce a parameter θ ∈ R |V |+|E | as
Intuitively, θ ij and θ i can be interpreted as the strength of coordination interaction of edge (i, j) ∈ E and the preference for activation of node i ∈ V , respectively. To capture pairwise interaction of the system, the parameter includes singleton as well as pairwise element, and this parameter will be used as a parameter of algorithms we will design in Section IV-B. Note that a coordination gain and activation cost of the system would be a function of the long-term time portion of edge coordinations and node activations, known as a stationary distribution, say π, of configurations, see the example in (4), as hinted in CG-OPT. This means that it is necessary to develop a time-by-time dynamic mechanism, which, if run for a sufficient amount of time, leads to a certain stationary distribution of configurations for a given θ. In this section, we illustrate how a simple Monte Carlo Markov Chain method may be used as a time-by-time dynamic mechanism, called the CDM. We then identify the optimal distribution over the feasible configurations that maximizes the network-wide coordination gain by producing random samples of configurations via CDM. Each algorithm we propose in Section IV-B produces a sequence of configurations
by updating a parameter θ over time so that the resulting longterm activation/coordination rate converges to the optimal solution of CG-OPT.
We now describe the CDM(θ) for a given parameter θ, where every node has a Poisson clock with unit rate and nodes decide a new configuration σ from a current configuration σ by the procedures as in two steps S1 and S2. Note that Poisson clock of each node leads to the uniform node selection, and for a given graph G, the CDM decides a configuration over time in a distributed manner with only one-hop message passing. In particular, when node i's clock ticks, it requires to know first, the configuration status {σ j } j ∈N (i) of its neighboring nodes, and second, the parameter of its neighboring edges, that is, {θ ij } j ∈N (i) , to decide its new configuration σ i in S1. Then, in S2, node i broadcasts its Each node, say i, when its Poisson clock ticks, performs the following: S1. Node i changes its configuration from σ i to σ i
S2. Node i broadcasts its updated σ i to all of neighbors in N (i).
updated configuration σ i to all of its neighboring nodes j ∈ N (i) for further configuration decision process. Simply, the CDM(θ) decides a new configuration mainly based on the status of its neighbors with large interaction strength.
One important feature is that the CDM for a given parameter θ leads to a continuous-time Markov chain {σ(τ )} ∞ τ =0 , achieving the following stationary distribution
where a, b is the inner product of two vectors a and b, so that
is an irreducible, aperiodic, and reversible Markov process [27] . Given the parameter θ, the ergodicity and reversibility of the Markov process imply that the marginal probability of nodes and edges under the stationary distribution p θ , denoted by s(θ) = ([s i (θ)] i∈V , [s ij (θ)] (i,j )∈E ), becomes the long-term time portion of node activation and edge coordination, simply called activation/coordination rate, characterized as: 1 
We remark that a graphical model representing the distribution in (7) corresponds to an Ising model in statistic physics, with an Ising parameter θ [12] , and the CDM(θ) is a Glauber dynamics over an Ising model under continuous-time setting.
B. Simulation-Based Parameter Update Algorithms
In CG-OPT, our goal is to find a distribution μ over configurations such that the resulting rate E μ [φ(σ)] becomes the optimal solution of CG-OPT. To that end, using the CDM(θ), we develop three distributed simulation-based algorithms that adaptively update the parameter θ over time, which we call Coordalgorithms, whose empirical activation/coordination rates from 
(c) Coord-ind :
samples generated by the CDM(θ) asymptotically converge to the optimal solution of CG-OPT. We now describe Coord-algorithms, where β > 0, α ∈ (0, 1], and θ min and θ max are the given constants; [·] y x := max(y, min(x, ·)); and a : Z ≥0 → R + is a positive step-size function. In Coord-algorithms, time is divided into frames t = 0, 1, . . . of fixed durations T , and each node i updates the parameter θ i and {θ ij } j ∈N (i) 2 following one of the three schemes, namely Coord-dual, Coord-steep, and Coord-ind. In S1, at the beginning of frame t, node i sends each of {θ ij [t]} j ∈N (i) to each j of its neighbors. 3 Then, in S2, the CDM(θ[t]) runs in a distributed way, leading to the local computation of instant and cumulative activation/coordination rates at and until the frame t, denoted byŝ[t] ands[t], respectively, that is,
[m] (12) where both empirical rates are locally computed. In S3, each scheme utilizes either of the computed empirical rates:
is also locally obtained (see [28] for a detailed form), thus, all of Coord-algorithms are run in a distributed manner.
C. Rationale Behind Coord-Algorithms
We now explain the rationale behind each scheme of Coordalgorithms that contains different perspectives of approximation and optimization mechanisms.
1) Coord-dual: Note that CG-OPT in (3) can be written as
where M is a set of all probability measures over the feasible configurations I(G). From this, we consider the following variant A-CG-OPT (parameterized by β > 0) of CG-OPT:
where H(μ) = − σ∈I(G ) μ σ log μ σ is the entropy of μ. Note that, compared to CG-OPT, A-CG-OPT has additional term 1 β H(μ) in its objective function. Since the entropy is bounded, that is, |H(μ)| ≤ log |I(G)|, a solution of A-CG-OPT, say (μ • , λ • ), becomes arbitrarily closer to that of CG-OPT for large β, which we call an efficiency parameter. Moreover, the entropy term leads to a distributed algorithm achieving the solution of A-CG-OPT in the following way.
Regarding the parameter θ as a dual variable of the Lagrangian of A-CG-OPT, its dual problem is simply represented as min θ D(θ) (see [28] for a detailed form). Then, the steepest descent method to solve this dual problem with the direction d[t] = −∇D(θ[t]) and step-size a[t] is given by d[t] , that is,
We highlight that Coord-dual in (9) is a distributed implementation of (15), where the key idea is to use first, the instant ratê s i [t],ŝ ij [t] from the current samples with second, the diminishing step-size a[t] satisfying (23), instead of computing the exact rate s i (θ[t]), s ij (θ[t]). Recall that computing the service rate directly requires information of all other nodes and edges, and measuring the service rate from the marginal probability in Markov chain induced by the CDM(θ[t]) requires a mixing time to reach the stationary distribution from a large number of samples. The proof of convergence and optimality of Coorddual usingŝ[t] with a[t] is due to the stochastic approximation technique [29] - [31] , as presented in Section IV-D.
2) Coord-steep: Taking the different perspective of CG-OPT, at any time, we sample the configuration via CDM, offering the steepest ascent direction for F(μ) in (13) . Among feasible coordinates, or element, of μ = [μ σ ] σ∈I(G ) , the steepest coordinate ascent method to solve (13) deduces to select a configuration σ according to the rule 4 σ = arg max
where from (13) we have (see [28] for the full derivation)
Then, sampling configurations from the distribution that concentrates on σ , for example, a distribution (parameterized by β), sayμ, such thatμ σ ∝ exp(β · ∇ σ F(μ)], approximates what the perfect steepest ascent method would do. Therefore, from (7) and (16), the steepest ascent method solving (13) is approximated via CDM(θ) by setting θ as follows:
Note that the target parameter θ is a fixed point of (17), and its distribution p θ depends on the marginal probability E θ [φ(σ)], which may evolve over time. Now, a fixed point iteration method of (17) is given by
To smooth out the effect of random movements of the marginal probability in (17) and take a fixed point in a limit, we consider an exponential moving average with a constant smoothing parameter α ∈ (0, 1] as follows:
The key rationale of Coord-steep in (10) toward a distributed operation of (18) is to use the cumulative rates[t] instead of E θ[t] [φ(σ)], which can guarantee the convergence to the optimal point (for large β), again, due to the stochastic approximation technique. In particular, from (12), we havē
thus the use of cumulative rates[t] has a similar effect of exploiting instant rateŝ[t] with 1 t step size that satisfies (23) , as in Coord-dual. 4 A partial derivative of a function f at the point x with respect to the ith variable x i is denoted by
3) Coord-ind:
A simple, myopic approach for a distributed operation to solve CG-OPT would be to decompose its objective into node/edge-wise local optimization problems, that is, node i minimizes its cost and edge (i, j) maximizes its utility. Considering long-term activation/coordination rates under the stationary distribution p θ , we associate each component of the parameter θ with each local problem as: min θ i C i (s i (θ)) and max θ i j U ij (s ij (θ)). However, such a myopic approach does not guarantee to achieve the optimal solution of CG-OPT due to the intercoupling from θ in the objective functions. To reflect this intercoupling among nodes and edges, we design the following problem A-IND-OPT 5 with a new objective function, denoted by Ψ i (θ i ) for node i and Ψ ij (θ ij ) for edge (i, j), where the key part lies in including artificially-designed penalty terms in
The basic rationale of A-IND-OPT is that each node and edge chooses its own parameter by considering only its own cost or utility, yet it might lead to the network-wide optimal status when imposing an appropriate amount of penalty, that is, the second term of (20) . The form of penalty (parameterized by β) is of critical importance to achieve the global optimal solution. This individually strategic form is well understood by a game-theoretic perspective, as presented in Section V-A. Now, the steepest ascent method to solve A-IND-OPT with the directions d i [t] = ∇Ψ i (θ i [t]) and d ij [t] = ∇Ψ ij (θ ij [t]) (see [28] for the full derivation), and the step-size a[t] is given by
Similar to the two earlier schemes, the key technique of
Coord-ind is a stochastic approximation which exploits the cumulative rates[t] from samples, instead of computing the exact s(θ[t]), ∇s(θ[t]). The role of adopting the cumulative rates[t]
toward convergence to optimality can be clearly seen by introducing the following alternative sequence, say {η[t]} t∈Z ≥0 , which will be shown to track the sequence {θ[t]} t∈Z ≥0 of (21) usings[t] with a constant step-size a[t] = α ∈ (0, 1] (see the Appendix for details), defined as
From (19) , the iterative update rule of the alternative sequence for large t is represented as follows:
where
Note that the alternative process (22) has an effect of exploitinĝ s[t] with diminishing step-size 1 t , as in Coord-dual.
D. Convergence and Optimality Analysis
For provable convergence analysis, we first make the following assumption, implying that we choose θ min and θ max , such that the interval [θ min , θ max ] is large enough to include the optimal solution of A-CG-OPT. 6 ( (1) and θ max ≥ βU ij (0). Now, the next theorem is our main result, which states the convergence of Coord-algorithms to a point arbitrarily close to the optimal solution of CG-OPT, under some mild conditions. over μ and λ) . ii) Optimality: Furthermore, Coord-algorithms approximately solve CG-OPT in the following sense: 6 The explicit values of θ min and θ max can be also be computed as in [32] .
Theorem 1 (Convergence and Optimality of Coord-
where λ is the optimal solution of CG-OPT in (3). The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix A, but we briefly provide the proof sketch here. Each scheme of Coordalgorithms is interpreted as a stochastic approximation procedure (SAP) with controlled Markov noise, and a main technical challenge lies in handling a nontrivial coupling between Markov process of the CDM(θ) and parameter θ updates. Simply, a provable convergence is guaranteed on the strength of stochastic approximation theory; in that we intuitively expect that by exploiting the instant rateŝ[·] with diminishing step size in (23) or the cumulative rates[·] that has an effect of 1 t step size, which satisfies (23) , the speed of variations of the parameter θ tends to zero after a sufficiently long time. Thus, its limiting behavior can be understood by ordinary differential equations (ODE), as given in [29] , [33] , and [34] and references therein. The additional challenge dealing with Coord-steep and Coord-ind (not existing for Coord-dual) is that they have higher order temporal dependencies in their updating rules, in that they use the current parameter θ[t] directly when obtaining the next parameter θ[t + 1] . To handle this issue, we define "alternative" process (see {ρ[t]} t∈Z ≥0 and {η[t]} t∈Z ≥0 in the Appendix) and argue its convergence under the relation to that of the original process {θ[t]} t∈Z ≥0 .
V. NEW INTERPRETATIONS VIA GAME THEORY
In Section IV, we develop three simulation-based algorithms that adaptively update the parameter θ in a distributed manner, but result in the optimal solution of CG-OPT. The rationale behind each scheme follows the framework of the distributed optimization. In this section, we take a different angle to reverse engineer two algorithms Coord-steep and Coordind in other framework, which is the game-theoretic one. As a background, game theory has emerged as a powerful tool not only to analyze the rational behavior of competitive multiagent systems (that is, just optimizing a local objective), but also to control the local behavior of each agent, see, for example, [14] . In such a framework, it is aimed that a game is designed with an artificially-selected payoff function so that local decisions of agents result in a system-wide desirable solution, such as an unique, fair, or socially-optimal point. Moreover, a game-theoretic approach provides valuable insights into the design of various robust local control rules through (distributed) game dynamics, whereas the standard centralized optimization framework cannot directly consider the interactions among agents. In this section, inheriting such a philosophy of the game-theoretic framework for the distributed optimization, we establish the desirable properties of equilibrium from a well-designed noncooperative game and present that Coord-steep and Coord-ind correspond to the stochasticallyapproximated variants of two popular game-learning dynamics.
A. CoordGain(β) Game
We first design a noncooperative game, denoted by CoordGain(β) with β > 0.
Algorithm 3: CoordGain(β).
(i) Players. Each node i ∈ V and each edge (i, j) ∈ E acts as a player. Let N = V ∪ E denote the set of players, and thus n ∈ N can be either a node i ∈ V or an edge (i, j) ∈ E. 7 (ii) Strategy. Each player n has a parameter θ n ∈ R as its own strategy. We denote the strategy profile of entire
The payoff function of player n ∈ N , denoted by Ψ n (θ n , θ −n ) : R |N | → R, is designed to be a net-coordination utility (or net-activation cost) with incurring penalty function V n (·) resulting from coordination:
Note that a player n's payoff Ψ n (·) 8 is determined by how aggressively other players are activated/coordinated as well as how it itself does. The parameter β quantifies penalty level in the players' payoffs, and we realize that it balances the tradeoff between the quality of equilibria and the convergence speed to the equilibria under game dynamics (see Theorem 2).
To achieve our goal of obtaining good equilibria and a provable transfer to distributed game dynamics converging to an equilibrium, the choice of penalty function V n (·) is of crucial importance. Our choice of penalty function (26) captures the following two features.
First, it appropriately measures each player's impact of excessive strategy on other players. One naïve choice of penalty to be imposed by a player n may be V n (θ) = θ n × s n (θ n , θ −n ), which is proportional to the current strategy θ n multiplied by its achieved long-term gain s n (θ), yet it is unclear that this penalty provides a provable framework of equilibrium analysis. On the other hand, our design of penalty function considers the expected strategy value E[Θ n ] that depends on the relative increasing speed of one's rate in the interval (−∞, θ n ), by letting Θ n ∈ [−∞, θ n ] denote a continuous random variable with the density function f Θ n (x) = 1 s n ( θ n , θ −n ) ∂ s n ( x , θ −n ) ∂ x so that the penalty function is represented as V n (θ) = E[Θ n ] × s n (θ n , θ −n ).
Second, the penalty function (26) is a function of self strategy and its marginal distribution, not the individual strategy values or payoffs of others. From simple algebra of (8), it is shown to be structured in terms of local information V n (θ) = θ n s n (θ) + ln(1 − s n (θ)). Since s n (·) can be measured in the midst of playing a player's own strategy, for example,ŝ n (·), via CDM with one-hop message passing, best response (BR) or payoff gradient of our game can be locally estimated. This feature enables us to develop distributed game dynamics, which indeed corresponds to Coord-steep and Coord-ind (see Section V-C).
B. Equilibrium Analysis
We first present popular notions: an NE and a PoA in the game theory.
Definition 1: In the CoordGain(β), the following conditions are satisfied.
1) A strategy profile θ NE is an NE if
) .
Furthermore, we say that an NE θ NE (if exists) of the game is nontrivial if players' activation/coordination rate at an equilibrium s(θ NE ) is positive and trivial otherwise. The PoA indicates the ratio between the social optimum and the worst equilibrium of the game, and we say noPoA if PoA = 1. We now present our main results on the equilibrium analysis.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness and PoA): In the CoordGain(β), the following statements are true. i) Uniqueness: For any β > 0, there exists a unique nontrivial NE θ NE . ii) PoA: (p θ NE , s(θ NE )) attains the optimal solution of A-CG-OPT, and, thus, lim β →∞ PoA = 1. The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Appendix B.
C. Reverse Engineering of Coord-Steep and Coord-Ind
Best response dynamics: The most popular dynamics is the BR dynamics in which each player chooses its best strategy, given the strategy (at the previous frame) of all other players, that is, at frame t
which leads to a fixed point of the following function in CoordGain(β): ∀i ∈ V, ∀(i, j) ∈ E:
Jacobi dynamics: The second dynamics is Jacobi dynamics, whose idea is to adjust each player's strategy gradually toward its BR strategy, that is, at frame t
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a smoothing parameter. 9 The smoothing parameter captures how accurately the dynamics follows the BR dynamics, where α = 1 corresponds to the BR dynamics. From (18) and (27), we can verify that a variant of Jacobi dynamics of our game (BR dynamics as a special case) that exploits cumulative rates[t] instead of s(θ[t]) at every frame is indeed equivalent to Coord-steep, that is, approximated (parameterized by β) steepest ascent method of CG-OPT. Gradient dynamics: Finally, we investigate the gradient dynamics [35] that each player n first determines the gradient of its payoff (25) , ∇Ψ n (θ), then updates its strategy in that direction with a constant step-size α ∈ (0, 1], that is, at frame t
The interpretation of the gradient dynamics from an economic perspective is that if the marginal coordination utility of an edge (i, j) exceeds the marginal penalty, that is, ∇Ψ ij (θ) > 0, its strategy is increased to achieve more coordination gain, and if ∇Ψ ij (θ) < 0, its strategy is decreased to reduce the penalty. From the objective function (20) and our payoff function (25), we can verify that Coord-ind is equivalent to a variant of gradient dynamics of our game, which exploitss[t] from samples instead of computing the exact s(θ[t] 
), ∇s(θ[t]).
To summarize, Coord-steep and Coord-ind are stochasticallyapproximated variants of Jacobi dynamics and gradient dynamics of CoordGain(β), respectively. Theorem 1 states that these dynamics converge to the unique nontrivial NE. Note that this is a new feature in this paper, not prevalent in general gametheoretic approaches for distributed optimization. In particular, there exists no generalized distributed dynamics converging to an NE (even it exists) due to lack of information, in a broad class of games [36] .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we carry out numerical experiments to assess our analytical findings of Coord-algorithms by considering networks with various topologies and cost functions. To this end, we consider "basic" topologies to show that our Coord-algorithms converge to the accurate solution and a random topology that is regarded as a collection of such basic topologies for more general results. The network topologies under which our results are presented here are star, complete, and random graphs. For numerical results, we consider proportional fairness across edges for coordination utility, that is, U ij (x) = log(x) for all edges (i, j) ∈ E, and consider two cost functions for nodes (C1) C i (x) = 2x 2 and (C2)C i (x) = 1 1−x for all nodes i ∈ V , as classified into the following four topologies.
1) STAR-C1: Star graph of 5 nodes with (C1).
2) COMP-C1: Complete graph of 4 nodes with (C1).
3) RAND-C1: Random graph of 15 nodes, 21 edges with (C1). 9 Jacobi dynamics generally make a smoother move than the BR dynamics, where a small smoothing parameter plays the role of compensating for the instability of the BR dynamics, see [24] . 4) RAND-C2: Random graph of 15 nodes, 21 edges with (C2). The above topologies are depicted in Fig. 2. Fig. 2(a) for STAR-C1, Fig. 2(b) for COMP-C1, and Fig. 2(c) for RAND-C1 and RAND-C2. Moreover, for a fixed frame duration T = 10, we choose a step-size function a[t] = 3/t for Coord-dual and α = 0.5 for Coord-steepandCoord-ind, which satisfies the condition (23) and take various values of efficiency parameter β from 0.5 to 5.0.
1) Convergence to the Optimal Solution
To demonstrate our analytical findings of convergence to optimality, we first consider simple cases that support Coordalgorithms find the "accurate" solution (that is, the unique NE of the game), where the exact solution can be numerically solved. Then, we show the performance of Coord-algorithms with two cost functions, under more general topology. a) Simple cases: Let λ and C denote the optimal solution of CG-OPT and the maximum coordination gain of the network, respectively. We first solve the exact optimal solution at STAR-C1: λ 1 = 0.447 and C = −5.218. Parameter updates of node 1 and the total coordination gain of Coord-algorithms with β = 5.0 are shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b), respectively. We see that all three algorithms converge to the accurate solution after long iterations within a range of O(1/β) gap, yet the convergence speeds of them do not show much difference in simple cases. Under COMP-C1, the exact optimal solution is attained at λ 1 = 0.6125 and C = −5.942, whose convergence results of node 1's activation rate and the total coordination gain are illustrated in Fig. 3(c) and (d) . Note that the algorithms take shorter time for convergence to the optimal solution in star than in comp, because each node has only one edge except the hub node, which corresponds to node 1 here, thus, pairwise interactions are less complex in star. b) Degree of coordination at optimal solution: We provide numerical results of two types of cost functions, under a random topology. For both cases RAND-C1 and RAND-C2, Fig. 4(b) and (c) shows that Coord-ind with α = 0.5 and β = 4.0 converges. Note that at the convergent status, the long-term activation rate of a node depends on the degree of coordination, particularly in terms of how many neighbors it has, and how powerful its neighbor is. As we see in Fig. 4(b) and (c), node 6 in Fig. 2(c) who has a very little contribution to the coordination gain since it has only one neighbor, achieves the lowest long-term activation rate, whereas node 13 has relatively a high long-term rate. Comparing nodes 9 and 15, even though both have two neighbors, node 9 achieves a higher long-term rate since one of its neighbors (node 13) is a hub so that node 9 may implicitly contribute to coordination gain of the network via node 13. Moreover, we see that the network becomes less aggressive to be coordinated and activated if nodes have cost functions C i (x) = 1 1−x (under RAND-C2), since it prevents exclusive node activations.
2) Comparison Among Coord-algorithms
Second, we compare the convergence of Coord-algorithms under RAND-C1. In Fig. 4(a) , we observe that regarding the coordination gain, Coord-steepandCoord-ind converge within 10 7 iterations, whereas Coord-dual still moves toward the optimal point even after 3 × 10 7 iterations. Note that Coord-dualandCoord-ind are not designed to follow the steepest ascent direction of CG-OPT, thus, Coord-steep exhibits the faster convergence. Between Coord-dual and Coord-ind, we expect that the rational and individual behavior when considering appropriate penalty functions in (26) brings significant improvements in the convergence rate.
3) Tradeoff Between Efficiency and Convergence Speed
Finally, we present the numerical results that show the convergence speed and efficiency (in terms of PoA) of the Coordalgorithms for various values of β. To support that the incurring coordination gain gap due to efficiency parameter is 1/β as stated in Theorems 1 and 2, we vary β from 0.5 to 5.0 and plot the coordination gain at the converged point and measure the convergence speed. Fig. 4(d) shows that, as β grows, Coordalgorithms require exponentially long time to converge, but the corresponding convergent point becomes closer to the optimal solution. From the numerical results under RAND-C1, coordination gain with β = 4.0 is −21.405 and converges after 2.4 × 10 7
iterations, whereas that with β = 0.5 is −22.11 and converges after 1.7 × 10 5 iterations.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
A. Summary
In this paper, we formulate an optimization problem that captures the amount of peer-to-peer coordination gain at the cost of node activation and develop three distributed simulation-based algorithms relying only on local message passing and observations, which we call Coord-algorithms. The theoretical findings of convergence to optimality of our algorithms take a stochastic approximation method that runs a Markov chain incompletely over time with a smartly designed step-size function. We also provide new interpretations of Coord-steep and Coord-ind from a game-theoretic perspective.
B. Limitation and Future Work
In spite of theoretical findings of convergence to optimality, our algorithms may suffer from slow convergence for some dense graphs. Even this slow convergence issue has been observed in many prior works of stochastic approximation theoretic algorithms [33] , [34] , there also several efforts have been made to expedite the convergence time [29] , [37] , which we believe, ensure practical values of our theoretical results. Future work includes the precise analysis of the convergence rate via applying theoretical techniques, for example, with the notion of mixing time or weak convergence theory [38] , [39] .
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We now prove that Coord-algorithms converge to the optimal solution of the A-CG-OPT in (14) on the strength of stochastic approximation theory [29] - [31] . To this end, we verify that each of Coord-algorithms is interpreted as a SAP with controlled continuous-time Markov process, where the stationary distribution of the underlying Markov process from the CDM indeed corresponds to an Ising model. The preliminary results about the convergence of a general SAP with a controlled Markov process is provided in our technical report [28] .
A. Proof of Theorem 1 (i): Convergence
In Step 1, we show that the dynamics asymptotically approach a deterministic trajectory that is described as a solution of an ODE system; and then in Step 2, we prove that the resulting trajectory converges to the solution of A-CG-OPT.
Step 1: In this step, we verify that each of Coord-algorithms matches to a SAP with controlled Markov noise. a) Coord-dual:: We first define a virtual time-scale 10 which interpolates the discrete sequence of (9) for the time-scale ζ(t). We also defineŝ(τ ) :=ŝ[t] · 1 ζ (t)≤τ ≤ζ (t+1) . It then should be clear that this setup matches with a SAP with controlled Markov noise, see [28, Appendix A] for the details of the equivalence of our schemes to the preliminary setup. Under our setup of strictly concave, continuously twice-differentiable utility functions U ij : [0, 1] → R for edge (i, j) ∈ E and strictly convex, continuously twice-differentiable cost functions C i : [0, 1] → R for node i, we have the following facts. First, the function denoted by v i (x, y) = C −1 i (−x/β) − y is Lipschitz continuous in x, since C i is strictly convex, continuously twicedifferentiable on compact set. It follows that C −1 i is Lipschitz continuous by the mean value theorem. Second, v i (x, y) is a linear function with respect to y; thus, it is obvious that it is uniformly continuous in y. Similar arguments hold for v ij (x, y) = U −1 ij (x/β) − y. Third, Markov process generated by the CDM(θ) is a continuous function of θ, and moreover θ → p θ is Lipschitz continuous for the bounded θ ∈ [θ min , θ max ]. Therefore, one can verify that the assumptions in [28] and, thus, we have from the recursion (see [28] for details)
Then, from (10) 10 We omit ζ and use θ(τ ) instead of θ ζ (τ ) for notational simplicity. and, thus, we haves
Now, when t grows large, the update rule (29) approximately becomes as follows under the assumption (A1):
and similarly
where g i (·), g ij (·) are defined in Section IV-C, and both are positive for convex/increasing function C i (·) and concave/increasing function U ij (·). The equality (a) holds from the first-order Taylor's expansion; and (b) comes from the Coordsteep rule (29) . As in the case of Coord-dual mentioned above, we now define the virtual time-scale κ(t) := t−1 m =1 1 m with κ(0) = 0, since the discrete sequence of Coord-steep in (29) is interpreted to have a step-size 1/t at iteration t, see (30) . Then, we construct an interpolated trajectory {ρ(τ )} τ ∈R + and verify the equivalence to the preliminary setup, which is straightforward by comparing (9) and (29) . We note that while a stochastic approximation idea in Coord-dual comes from the diminishing step-size a[·], adopting the cumulative rates [ 
Consequently, from Step 1 and Step 2, we complete the proof that under all Coord-algorithms, θ[t] converges to θ • , where the optimal solution of A-CG-OPT is attained.
B. Proof of Theorem 1 (ii): Optimality
We now show the asymptotic optimality (in terms of β) of Coord-algorithms by verifying the relation between the solution of A-CG-OPT, that is, [p θ • , s(θ • )], and that of CG-OPT, denoted by λ along with an appropriate distribution μ ∈ M. Note that (λ , μ ) is one feasible solution of A-CG-OPT, thus, it follows that:
where (a) comes from the nonnegative property of the entropy; (b) holds from the optimality of (μ • , λ • ) in A-CG-OPT; and finally we used the upper bound of the entropy in terms of the cardinality of its support set |I(G)| for (c).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
i) Uniqueness: We prove the existence and the uniqueness of nontrivial NE in our game CoordGain(β) using a potential game approach. Consider the following function P (θ) on the space C + = {θ : s(θ) > 0}, which is the set of strategies producing "nontrivial" rates, defined by where L(·) is defined in [28] to describe a dual function of A-CG-OPT. It is easy to check that P (θ) is strictly concave in θ since P (·) is the supremum of L(·), which is a family of affine functions in θ. We now show that CoordGain(β) for any constant β > 0 is an ordinal potential game [40] with the potential function P (θ), that is, sgn ∂ Ψ n (θ) ∂ θ n = sgn ∂ P (θ) ∂ θ n , for all players n ∈ N. To verify this, we have derivative of each player's payoff function as (see the detailed form in [28] ) Therefore, on the space C + , we have sgn ∂ Ψ n (θ)
for node player i ∈ V , and similarly for edge player (i, j) ∈ E.
From the standard results in potential game theory and strict concavity of P (·), the solution maximizing P (·) is an NE θ NE and, moreover, it is unique and nontrivial. ii) PoA: The proof of PoA is straightforward from Appendix VIII-B, since we observe θ NE = θ • .
